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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Ind: Kampiles

SUBJECT: (Optional)

KAMPILES, William P.

FROM:

Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

OLC # 72-3029/9
13 SEP 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Legislative Counsel
Attn:

2.

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The attached memoranda deal with actions which have been taken to strengthen security within CIA, industry and the Intelligence Community. They respond to Section V of the KAMPILES' Briefing Outline.

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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

Steps Previously Taken within CIA

A program to expand the briefcase package inspection program is ready for implementation once a decision is reached. It will be conducted by the Federal Protective Officers on a routine basis seven days a week and twenty-four hours a day.

Commencing immediately, systematic counterintelligence procedures will be established by the Office of Security to investigate employee accesses to secure areas outside of normal duty hours and to review the pattern of employee after-hours accesses to Headquarters area buildings.

The Office of Security currently has ordered active studies into two methods of controlling document reproduction. One concept involves the modification of reproduction equipment to house a badge reader which would maintain accountability for all copies made, at least to the extent of maintaining an audit trail of an individual employee's use of the equipment. The other concept involves development of a paper or print process which is not copiable.

The Deputy Directors of the Agency are being directed, immediately, to establish positive, accountable document controls for particularly sensitive materials under their cognizance.

Arrangements are being finalized for the Office of Security to conduct a series of briefings of senior staffs throughout the Agency. The briefings will comprehensively review security problems discovered during the past several months through the reinvestigation program, briefcase inspection program, etc., and will reemphasize the command and managerial responsibility in implementing sound security practices.

The Office of Security is reminding Agency managers that personnel are available as speakers, panelists, consultants, etc., to assist command channels in the security education and indoctrination of small employee groups. As you know, the Office of Security recently completed a formal indoctrination of the Agency population in a number of presentations to large audiences.

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Steps Previously Taken within Industry

In April 1977, following the revelations of the Moore and Boyce/Lee espionage cases, a comprehensive impact study was completed by the Office of Security. As a consequence, the Director caused several security initiatives and gave the necessary impetus to others which have been successfully implemented to the enhancement of Agency and Intelligence Community security. Agency programs successfully implemented include:

1. A rigorous staff personnel security reinvestigation program.
2. Expanded security education and reindoc-trination efforts throughout the Agency.
3. Enhancement of appraisal criteria in Industrial Security Approvals.
4. Initiation of the Industrial Contractor Polygraph Program.
5. Increased spot checks of briefcases, packages and parcels at all Agency facilities in the Washington Metropolitan area.
6. Initiation of a program of unannounced security audits of Agency contractor facilities.
7. Initiation of research to enhance security movement of classified information via tamper-resistant security containers and to preclude unauthorized reproduction of documents via use of special paper, special inks, and other techniques.
8. A personal interest in and involvement by the Director and senior Agency managers in the adjudication and penalty assessment procedures involving Agency employees who have violated security regulations.

Steps Previously Taken within the
Intelligence Community

Programs initiated by the Director to tighten the security of the Intelligence Community have included:

1. The strengthening of the Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee as a focal point for reporting and tracking unauthorized disclosures and for raising security consciousness in the Community.
2. Maintaining a freeze since 1 June 1977 on the total number of sensitive compartmented clearances throughout the Community.
3. Initiation of a program to revalidate security clearances by effecting zero-based reviews in Intelligence Community and contractor facilities.
4. Directing contracting and legal authorities to strengthen the security provisions of contracts between commercial firms and Intelligence organizations.

75-6065/1

5 September 1978

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On 21 July you asked SCC members to report the actions being taken to curb leaks of sensitive information, especially those appearing to be deliberate leaks to undercut Administration policies. I fully share your concern and particularly feel that grave damage is being done to our capability to carry on the legitimate intelligence activities of this country.

Over the past year I have taken the following actions to tighten security in the Intelligence Community:

- Strengthened the Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee as a focal point for reporting and tracking unauthorized disclosures and for raising security consciousness in the Community.
- Directed and maintained a freeze since 1 June 1977 on the total number of sensitive compartmented clearances throughout the Community.
- Introduced the concept of revalidating clearances by effecting zero-based reviews in Intelligence Community and contractor facilities. *The first round completed resulted in a 20% reduction!*
- Tasked contracting and legal authorities to strengthen the security provisions of contracts between commercial firms and intelligence organizations.
- Directed a major overhaul of industrial contractor security activities to include both Agency-sponsored and national programs.

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- Developed cooperative procedures with the FBI to ensure a full exchange of information and coordinated reviews of any evidence of espionage activities against our government.

With respect to my specific response to your directives of 21 July, I have taken the following actions within the CIA:


- Reduced the number of people attending my Director's staff meetings where sensitive information such as discussed in the SCC is most likely to be considered.
- Ordered a rigorous personnel security reinvestigation program within CIA based on a 5-year cycle.
- Personally assumed a role in adjudication and penalty assessment procedures involving Agency employees who have violated security regulations.
- Ordered expanded security education and reindoc-trination efforts throughout the Agency.
- Tightened controls over media contacts by CIA personnel.
- Initiated research to enhance security movement of classified information via tamper-resistant security containers and to preclude unauthorized reproduction of documents via use of special paper, special inks and other techniques.
- Dismissed an Agency employee who was found to be transmitting classified information in an unauthorized fashion, probably with the intent of influencing policy.

There are two areas where I believe concentrated Executive policy support and actions are needed in order to help tighten our security. The first involves encouraging

the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate unauthorized disclosures even if prosecution appears, at the outset, improbable for reasons of Security. As it is today, the more sensitive the substance of a leak, the less likely the perpetrator will be identified. The second area involves deciding whether additional legislation is needed with respect to breaches of security and if so, what sort. The more I make the case in public and before the Congress that our national interests are being endangered by security breaches today, the more I am asked directly what, if any, legislation I support. At the present time I waffle my response out of concern for getting ahead of the Administration's position on this issue. I do believe that the time has come when we must grapple with it.

I assure you of my continued dedication to and efforts : in support of your desire to reduce the unconscionable flow of leaks we have experienced in the past year and a half.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Stansfield Turner", written in a cursive, flowing style.

STANSFIELD TURNER

V. Security Steps Taken with Regard to Congress

DCI has also taken steps, within limits of authority, to reduce potential for leaks on the Hill.

A. Problem was so serious in May and June of this year that the President personally met with Congressional leaders to request their cooperation.

B. Traditionally, both DOD and the DCI have had authority to issue compartmented clearances to Congressional staffs. Different standards have been used. Pursuant to agreement with Secretary Brown, this authority now rests solely with DCI, under standards transmitted to Senate and House leaders and the Intelligence Committees in July and August of this year.

C. Guidelines, at some cost of goodwill, restrict compartmented clearances to full Committee staff employees. Problem of retroactivity remains.

D. We have actively cooperated with the Morgan/Schmitt Subcommittee of the Senate Ethics Committee which, under S. Res. 338, 88th Congress, and S. Res. 400 94th Congress, has the responsibility of investigating possible unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information by members, officers, or employees of the Senate.